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To have a good of one’s own

James Sterba argues that one of the reasons why all living beings are moral subjects and have moral worth is that they can be benefitted and harmed (Sterba 2001, Sterba 1998).What does this imply? Sterba himself doesn’t use a lot of time on going into the details of this question. Instead, he bases his view of the subject on the arguments of Paul Taylor, a philosopher whom he sees as a great inspiration. So what does Taylor say?

Consideration

According to Taylor, whether it be animal, plant, or microorganism, each living individual has a good of its own and possesses a value independent of its relation to other living beings. He terms the aforementioned intrinsic worth. Taylor wherefore argues that this possession of intrinsic worth implies that we should consider all living beings when discussing whether or not to recycle, and the ramifications bought forth in connection with Earth Hour (Taylor 2011).

What is more, on account of our ability as humans to act morally, we accordingly have a duty to promote and preserve a living entity’s good as an end in itself (Ibid.)

This not only means that dolphins or porcupine have a value independent of their significance to other creatures. It also means that we, as humans, should promote and preserve them for their own purposes. Regardless of personal gain, we should do our best to preserve their habitat and encourage their wellbeing.

When Taylor talks about what is good for a creature, he talks about what “does it good” in the sense of enhancing or preserving its life, wellbeing, and that which is to its benefit. What’s considered bad for a living being is something essentially detrimental to its life, wellbeing, and that which causes it harm (Ibid.). For us humans this partly involves getting enough to eat, a place to sleep, and social interaction with other humans. When someone deprives us of these things it is of great harm to our lives.

Trees grow taller

How then, does Taylor justify that absolutely all living beings have a good of their own? His idea of the intrinsic worth possessed by a living being does not entail that the being must take an interest in what affects its life for better or for worse, implying that it has a certain degree of desires and wants. It may indeed possess this worth, unaware that favorable and unfavorable events are taking place in its life (Ibid.).

Trees grow tall to obtain enough sunlight, and they communicate with the help of fungi to warn each other of insect attacks despite the absence of consciousness. Whether conscious or not, every living being pursues its own good, all striving to preserve their own lives, and to find the best possible way of doing so (Ibid.).

The same applies for humans. Even though we have desires and beliefs, we are not actively conscious of all the things that may be in our interest (Ibid.). While we may desire a date for its sweetness, it may also be in our interest to eat it regardless of our desire for it. We may benefit from consuming it despite being unaware of its supply of nutrients such as calcium, magnesium and vitamin A, substances crucial to our vision, bone growth, and muscle tissue, hence essential for our body to work properly.

References

Sterba, James P. 1998 ”A Biocentrist Strikes Back” Environmental Ethics 20 (4):361-376 (1998) Philosophy Documentation Center
Taylor, Paul 2011 Respect of Nature A Theory of Environmental Ethics Prinston: Prinston University Press

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