Different treatment

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Say we are convinced by James P. Sterba’s argument; we’re all equal. The fact of the matter is that we do treat each other differently.

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It’s commonly agreed that it’s ok to eat pigs but not humans, and chopping down a pine to get a Christmas tree is not seen as bad behavior by most people, even though it implies killing it.

When you move within the realm of philosophy one thing you’ll notice is that no matter what statement or claim you make, you’ll have to be able to justify it and its implications (Of course we philosophers do not always do that, either because we take it for gathered that people agree with us, or sometimes because of pure arrogance).

Three points of referenceVintage_Three_Headed_Woman_by_HauntingVisionsStock

Even if you’re not a philosopher an explanation seems pressing. There are three things that are worth noticing in this regard, and taken together they will give a sense of how Sterba justifies his claim.

  1. By equal Sterba means; no one is superior in that they have a right to dominate others. This definition involves an action of how to treat and behave towards others, and it is not a characteristic of the beings in question.
  2. Sterba specifies that the subject should be able to get by on its own, and to require that humans do something beneficial for other living beings is to require too much of them.
  3. Sterba states that just as we say that humans are equal but treat them differently, so can we say that living beings are equal but treat them differently.

The question arises as to what treatment is justified if we’re all equal? According to Sterba we are bond by certain principles that should guide us when treating other living beings [this includes humans as well].

Defense

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First of all, we have the right to defend ourselves if we are aggressed upon or attacked. You’ll in this case be justified in defending your rights, even if it ends up you killing or harming those that attack. This helps explain how one is justified in killing other living beings like bacteria even though you, according to Sterba, possess the same amount of moral worth.

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However, you are not justified in defending yourself when others aggress against your non-basic needs when it’s the only way for them to meet their basic needs (definition below). That is if you can expect some degree of self-sacrifice from the aggressor. You can by this principle defend your cake against aggressive ants. However, if a starving human tries to have some you’re not justified in defending your cake (unless you’re starving as well), because you can expect a certain degree of self-sacrifice form humans.

Because Sterba in no way mentions humans specifically in these two principles, he claims that they are a species-neutral. In addition they express the ground of limited defense for preferring oneself, and the members of one’s own species over others, and this is consistent with the equality of species.

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By basic needs Sterba means that which is necessary to live a descent life for humans in which we need; food, shelter, medical care, protection, companionship, and self-development. Included are certain cultural and social dimensions. Non-basic needs in this case are those that moves beyond this and can be seen as luxury needs.

Other living organisms basic needs however, are of a lesser degree and are that of a healthy live. The standard in this case emphasizes their physical and biological dimensions, and in contrast for humans’ basic needs these are more invariant.

To aggress

4362122086_dd160420d8_oActions where you aggress against the basic needs of others for the sake of your own basic needs are justified. This explains how we can eat meat and vegetables, and still say that all living beings have the same amount of moral worth. When it stands between eating other living beings to preserve your own life, and ending a life of a living being you are justified in preferring your own.

However, Sterba points to certain limits as to what is justified. One is not permitted to aggress against others basic needs to satisfy one’s own non-basic needs. Killing a mink for the sake of fashion may thus be interpreted as wrong by this principle.

When it comes to aggressing to meet ones basic needs this is not justified if one can expect a comparable degree of self-sacrifice from others. Here again one finds a justification as to why we are allowed to prefer our own species in certain cases, because those we can expect a certain degree of self- scarifies from are humans.

Compensation

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As a last principle Sterba poses that one is required to compensate and restore if one of the other four principles has been violated. One example may be when we chop down trees to make homes to meet our basic need for shelter, we should then compensate by planting new trees in its place.

Sterba claims that these principles taken together constitute a set of environmental principles that are clearly not biased in favor of the human species, and thus provide a defensible interpretation of commitment of biocentrists to the equality of species (Sterba 1998).

 

References

  • Sterba, James P. 1998 ”A Biocentrist Strikes Back”  Environmental Ethics 20 (4):361-376 (1998) Philosophy Documentation Center

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