We are all equal

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KONICA MINOLTA DIGITAL CAMERAHow can Sterba claim that all living beings are equal when there is such an apparent difference between us? Single-celled microbes clone themselves, elephants nurture tight social bonds within their herd, and humans have developed an analytical way of thinking. How can it be that these kind of factors don’t matter when it comes to moral worth?

The rational human

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Several philosophers argue that human beings are the only ones that have value in themselves, one of the reasons being that we possess rationality. We can find this view reflected in Kant when he argues that humans have no direct duties concerning animals, they are merely a means to an end. Man on the other hand, is a rational being and must therefore always be treated as an end, and never as a means only (Rachels 1986).

Sterba however, claims that we are equal to other living beings when it comes to moral consideration. He argues along with Paul Taylor that the different traits we all have do not give us reason to deem the members of one species as superior to the members of another (Sterba 1998, Taylor 2011).

This implies that the traits of which make humans truly unique, one of them being rationality, still does not make us superior to other beings. Sterba doesn’t deny that these traits are valuable to us; they have enabled us to form civilizations, construct machines that do our work for us, and many, many other feats. As humans, we would by no means be better off if we were to trade in those traits for the distinctive traits found in nonhuman species (Sterba 1998).

Other species

5613298173_a095d9e70f_bThe same holds true for nonhuman species according to Sterba. Generally, neither pigeons, cheetahs, sheep, nor cattle would be better off if they were to trade in their distinctive traits for the distinctive traits of other species. In order for the cheetah to acquire the distinctive traits possessed by humans, Sterba believes it would presumably have to be so transformed that its paws became something like hands to accommodate its human like mental capabilities. This would compromise its distinctive speed which was part of what made it a cheetah in the first place, and catching the agile prey it usually hunts would prove difficult without this specific ability (Sterba 1998).

One may also argue that some advantages might be gained if a species could keep the traits they already possess while acquiring one or several distinctive traits possessed by some other species. For example, it might improve the lives of us humans if we could retain our distinctive traits, such as our opposable thumbs, while acquiring the ability to fly as a bird.

Traits

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However, Sterba points out that many of the distinctive traits of species cannot be, even imaginatively, added to the members of other species without substantially altering the original species. Only in fairy tales and in the world of Disney can species enjoy a full array of distinctive traits from other species (Sterba 1998).

Even though Sterba himself does not mention it, we do see exemplifying scenarios in comics and graphic novels where humans that have gained extraordinary traits are no longer seen as human, but rather as something different yet possessing human traits. Sometimes the acquired traits evoke respect and admiration from “normal” humans, like that of the celebrated Spiderman. Other times they’re met with repulsion and suspicion, which might well lead to the same kind of persecution as of the unfortunate mutants in X-men.

312325017_571845aa7b_oSterba concludes that there is no apparent reason to believe that distinctively human traits are more valuable than the distinctive traits found in other species. Rationality would therefore not be more significant than any other trait, and by this we would seemingly have to regard the members of all species as equals sharing the same moral worth (Sterba 1998).

References

  • Rachels, James 1986 “Kantian Theory: The Idea of Human Dignity” //The Elements of Moral Philosophy,//  Random House
  • Sterba, James P. 1998a  JUSTICE for HERE and NOW US: Cambridge University Press
  • Taylor, Paul 2011 Respect of Nature A Theory of Environmental Ethics Prinston: Prinston University Press

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